Expository Lectures on the Heidelberg Catechism (1864), George W. Bethune · PDF

Lecture XLIII. The Order, the Obligation, and Division of the Duties Enjoined by the Ten Commandments

Thirty-fourth Lord’s Day

It having been settled by the previous teachings of the Catechism, according to the Scriptures, that the believer called to salvation in Jesus Christ is by the same gospel called to do good works, (86th, 87th, 88th, 89th Questions and Answers,) and also that “good works are only those which proceed from true faith [and] are performed according to the law of God and to his glory; not such as are founded on our imaginations, or the institutions of men”; it becomes us to inquire what is the law of God, according to which all the conduct of men should be regulated; and we are taught to answer this question by a recital of the Decalogue, or ten commandments, as they are recorded in the twentieth chapter of Exodus, 1–17, collated with Deuteronomy v. 6–21; and the next eleven Lord’s days are occupied with an exposition of the commandments in their order. They are divided into two tables, because Jehovah wrote them twice, once on two stone tablets prepared by himself (Deut. v. 22), which Moses let fall from his hands, and brake in his indignation at the people’s idolatry of the golden calf (Ex. xxxii. 19); and a second time on two tables like the first, prepared, according to his order, by Moses (Ex. xxxiv. 1; Deut. x. 1). Which commandments were written on the first table, and which on the second, we are not expressly told, though it is certain that there were ten in all (Deut. iv. 13; x. 4). All are agreed that the first table included those duties which we owe immediately to God; the second, those he has commanded us to render him through duties to our fellow-men; which is in agreement with our Lord’s condensation of the whole law into two great commandments: the first, “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy mind, and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength;” the second, “Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself” (Matt. xxii. 37–40); the first of which we find in Deuteronomy vi. 5, and elsewhere; the second, in Lev. xix. 18, 34. But here the Reformed with all the evangelical churches are at difference with the Jews, the Roman Catholics, and a large majority of the Lutherans. Our churches reckon four commandments to the first table, and six to the second. What division was established among the ancient Jews is not very clear. Josephus says (Ant. c. v. 8) that God showed them two tables with the ten commandments written upon them, five on each table, which according to the order of his enumeration would, against propriety, throw the fifth commandment into the first table instead of the second, which includes our offices to men (Ant. c. v. 5). Philo, however, appears to have considered the preface, “I am the Lord thy God,” &c., to have been the first commandment; but as he omits, in his recital, the words of what we consider the first, passing over them to those, “Thou shalt not make any graven gods,” &c., it would seem most probable that he conjoined the sense of the preface with the first commandment (in our order). Athanasius follows him in this.1

The Roman Catholics combine the first and second commandments, giving them in their catechisms abridged, so as to avoid the strength of the prohibition against employing images in their devotions. Thus, reducing the number of commandments in the first table to three, they are obliged, that they may keep the number ten, to divide the tenth into two, which is done by making the first clause of the tenth (as given Deut. v. 21, “Thou shalt not desire thy neighbor’s wife,”) the ninth, and the rest of it, the tenth; to which the Reformed churches object, as that would be merely a repetition of the seventh, whereas the closing precept is intended to forbid all envious craving of whatever is our neighbor’s. Many of the Lutherans, being partial to pictures in churches for the illustration of divine truths to the laity, have followed the course of the Papists with regard to the disposition of the ten precepts; but it is fair to add that their best divines lay little stress on the matter, as Walchius, very famous among them, says: “Concerning the division of the Decalogue, there is much dispute. The doctors of the Reformed church give four precepts to the first table and six to the second, in doing which they separate from the first commandment what relates to the making of images, and rank it as the second commandment; but join the ninth and tenth as one. They contend fiercely for this division, and many of them [Anhaltini, Marpurgenses atque alii] accuse Luther of omitting the precept on image-making. We, however, give three precepts to the first table, and seven to the second, referring what God says against image-making to the first precept, and separating the ninth from the tenth. This discussion is of little account. The thing is that it may be arranged so as to give each the liberty of opinion on the division, for it is enough that the commandments be reckoned as ten.” (Intro. in Lib. Ecc. Luth. Symbol, L. 1, vi. sec. xl. p. 657.) In this liberal sentiment the eminent Turretin agrees.2

A more important question arises:—

What proof have we that these ten commandments are binding upon us?

The delivery of this law of the two tables on Sinai by Jehovah to the hands of Moses for the people of Israel was not its first promulgation. It had been the rule of God for man from the creation, though unwritten till the finger of God engraved it amidst the terrible glories of his presence. From the beginning he had claimed an entire sovereignty. The apostle tells us, in the first chapter of Romans, that men knew God from the creation of the world, and that idolatry in all its forms originated in their departure from the worship of the true, incorruptible God. Reverence for the name of God is a duty clearly consequent upon our allegiance and worship. The Sabbath was ordained in Eden on the day after the creation of man, while he yet was sinless. Honor to parents, respect of human life, purity as opposed to licentiousness, the right of property, veracity or truthfulness, are all virtues essential to a social constitution in which men were placed by their divine author, and were required by him always, as many facts in the early sacred history show. The final precept, “Thou shalt not covet,” enforces the keeping of the heart before him who reads our thoughts, and is a resumption of the previous five, while the necessity of such inward restraint to a secure morality was fully shown by the manner of the original sin, for had not the man and woman first lusted after the forbidden fruit, they had not seized it.

We learn also from Holy Scripture, that the solemn, written enunciation of this law was an act of God’s merciful care over his people. He had, as the apostle tells us (Gal. ii. 8, 17), preached the gospel to Abraham four hundred and thirty years before, when he made a covenant with the father of all the faithful, saying, “In thee shall all nations be blessed.” His natural posterity, though increased to a very considerable people, had never been raised to the style of a distinct, free, independent nation, until Jehovah, taking his place as their king, led them out of the land of Egypt, with a promise of bringing them into the land promised by him to their fathers. It was requisite, therefore, that there should be a glorious inauguration of his authority, with a publication of the laws, or constitution, according to which he would reign; and on the other hand, that the people should declare their fealty to their Theocrat by pledging themselves to obey his laws or accepting the constitution which he gave them. Hence the transaction at Sinai was in fact a covenant, God manifesting himself on the mount, Israel protesting, with united voice, “All that the Lord hath said, will we do, and be obedient;” in token of which “Moses took the blood” of burnt-offerings and peace-offerings, “and sprinkled it on the people, and said, “Behold the blood of the covenant which the Lord hath made with you concerning all these words” (Ex. xxiv. 3–8). You will observe that, according to the analogy of all Scripture, Israel stood before the Lord in a double capacity, as a political nation, and as a church,—as the natural offspring of Abraham, and as the type (the truly faithful among them included by the reality) of the spiritual descendants of the father of all the faithful, the seed of the promised seed,3 the church of Christ which he hath redeemed out of all ages and all kindreds of the world. The inference plainly is, that the law is binding on us, who profess allegiance to God through the covenant in the blood of Christ; not the political law, which concerned Israel as a nation, or the ceremonial, which was done away by Christ, the substance of its shadows and the reality of its types, but the moral law, the law of the ten precepts on the two tables, which, as they had been binding on men from the beginning of the world until Sinai, are binding, since then, until the end of the world.

This is the more obvious from the indisputable consideration, that, as the effect of faith, according to the evangelical scheme, is to produce repentance in the converted sinner by working love in his heart, and so enabling him to overcome the temptations of the world, it must follow that the genuine effects of saving faith are in all ages the same; and, therefore, the fundamental rules or principles of a godly life are in all ages the same. Precepts which only affect men in the regulation of their conduct under a temporary and changeable system, such as the national polity, or typical preparatory ritual of the Jews, may, for that reason, be changed or abrogated; but those which are essential to our relations as human creatures with God, and with our fellow-creatures under the social system God has ordained for us on earth, must be perpetual. Such are the ten commandments.

Thus we find this, the moral law, confirmed by our Lord and the writers of the New Testament, as the rule of life for all believers. Every precept of the two tables is reinforced, often in the very same language and with a distinct recognition of the source from which they are taken, as the ground of the authority.

Exception has, it is true, been by some taken with respect to the fourth commandment, ordaining the rest of the Sabbath in order to its sanctification. That commandment, they say, is ceremonial, therefore belonging to the law of ordinances which has been abolished; and typical, relating to the “spiritual rest,” or freedom from the necessity of our own works, as ground of justification, that God may perform his works in us for his own glory. We shall examine this matter farther when we come to the particular study of the fourth commandment; but at present it is enough to say that on the same principles which require us to take the law of the two tables, we must take it as a whole. God himself divided the moral, the political, and the ceremonial laws from each other, so that we have no right to wrench any part out of one to put it in one of the others.4 Besides, the law of the Sabbath was given to our first parents while yet sinless in Eden, and therefore to the whole race, irrespective of national or ceremonial or accidental distinctions of any kind; nor had it, whatever typical character it acquired afterwards, any such character at the time of its original promulgation. The Saviour himself, when he asserted that “the Sabbath was made for man and not man for the Sabbath,” not only points out the spirit of the precept in which it is to be obeyed, but establishes the universality and perpetuity of the precept.

There is another remark preliminary to our exposition of the commandments, which, in consistency with our past and future reasoning, should here be made.

The answer to the 93d Question states that “the first” table “teaches us how we are to behave towards God; the second, what duties we owe to our neighbor.” This language, though conformable enough to the common uses of the terms, is not strictly, that is to say, ethically, accurate. Properly, we owe duty only to God. He only is our Lord. What are popularly termed duties to our neighbor are not, therefore, in a strict sense, duties to him, but duties to God, who has commanded us so to deport ourselves toward our neighbor as his precepts prescribe. That this is the meaning of the Catechism here, we know from what Ursinus (its chief author) says in his commentary on the place: “The Decalogue is divided, according to the things themselves which are commanded or forbidden, into the immediate and mediate worship of God. Generally, is commanded in the Decalogue the worship of God; that which is contrary to God’s worship is forbidden. The worship of God is either immediate, when moral works are performed immediately unto God, or mediate, when moral works are performed unto our neighbor in respect of God. . . . . The obedience of the second table of the law is not the immediate worship of God, as the obedience of the first is; yet is it the mediate worship of God, that is, such as is performed to God in our neighbor mediating, or coming between God and us. For the duties [offices] of love toward our neighbor ought to flow, or proceed, out of the love of God [qu. love to God]; and being so performed, they are acceptable to God, and are no less done to God himself than the obedience of the first table. . . . . The worship required in the two tables differeth in [character of] its objects: for the first table has an immediate object only, which is God; the second has both an immediate object, our neighbor, and farther also a mediate object, God.” Hence Ursinus, in his sermon on the Decalogue, comprises it generally in God’s worship, divided into two parts: 1. Immediate, towards God alone; 2. Mediate, or towards our neighbor for God’s sake.

The value and even necessity of this careful application of terms over the looser language of the text will be seen when we consider the proneness of men to separate the two tables in such a way as though they might observe the first table without observing the second, or the second without observing the first. The former is the fatal error of those pharisaical devotees who are zealous in prayers or other forms of worship, in orthodoxy of opinion or ceremonial, while they neglect charity of heart and speech and act towards their fellow-creatures. The unity of the law of God utterly condemns such inconsistency, and shuts the gate of heaven in the faces of all who practise it. There is no love to God which is not followed by, or rather does not include, love to our neighbor; which is farther shown by the fact that we cannot, as in the address Christ has taught us, claim God as our Father in heaven, without acknowledging as our brethren all his children on earth. The other is the equally fatal error of those who, proud of their personal and social morality, think that they can keep the second table of the law without observing the first, or love their neighbor without first loving God with all their hearts, and rendering him the personal and public homage which he requires. The very source of the law condemns this, because being the law of God, no part of it can be kept without hearty and supreme reverence to the will of him who enjoins the whole. The very order of the law condemns it, because we cannot reach the second table without going through the first. The very terms of the law condemn it, because, if we are to love God with all our heart, how can we love our neighbor except love to him be included by our love to God? Again: If we do not make this distinction, that is, of duties immediate and duties mediate to God, all morality is thrown into uncertainty and confusion. If God be the central source and central object of all duty, no laws emanating from him, no services rendered to him, can ever clash, as no number of straight lines, drawn from a given point, can ever cross each other, or, converging to one point, can ever meet except in that point. While, therefore, we consider our duty referrible to God only, there can be no confusion. All we have to ascertain, is, what God requires of us, and all our relative services toward our fellow-men fall into their appropriate places within the harmonious whole. But when we attempt to apportion or distribute our services among our fellow-men, as though our duty were to each of them, we find the number of relations so great, yet so intermingled, that we cannot see how, amidst the variety and seeming conflict of interests, to combine them in harmonious proportions. How shall a man proportion the duty he owes to his father with the duty he owes to his mother, when their commands or seeming interests are adverse?—the duties he owes to conflicting brothers?—the duties to his family with those he owes to his country, or those to his country with those due to the world? No human intellect has grasp or continuity enough to reason through all the possibilities of results, to determine one of a thousand among the difficulties which may, and every day do, arise. Invariable, supreme love to God is the only clue we can have to guide us through what is plain to him, but an inextricable labyrinth to us.

Take, for example, the question which Arch-Deacon Paley moots in his Moral Philosophy (a system which should never be tolerated for a moment under any pretext in a Christian school): Is it ever right to tell a lie? If we proceed on the principle that all our duty is to God, the thing is settled at once, for God requires truth in the heart, speech, and act; nor can we imagine it possible that in any circumstances a lie can be acceptable to him; but if, adopting the division which Paley follows, of duty to God and duty to man, the latter separates itself from the first, and we attempt to decide it on the comparative benefit or injury of the results to ourselves or others. Thus the Arch-Deacon asserts that a lie is justifiable in certain cases, as, “compliments in the subscription of a letter; a servant’s denying his master [to be at home]; a prisoner’s pleading not guilty; an advocate asserting the justice, or his belief in the justice, of his client’s cause. In such instances, no confidence is destroyed, because none was reposed; no promise to speak the truth is violated, because none was given or understood to be given.” Or “where the person you speak to has no right to know the truth, or, more properly, where little or no inconvenience results from the want of confidence in such cases: as where you tell a falsehood to a madman for his own advantage; to a robber, to conceal your property; to an assassin, to defeat or divert him from his purpose. The particular consequence is, by the supposition, beneficial; and as to the general consequence, the worst that can happen is, that the madman, the robber, the assassin will not trust you again; which (beside that the first is incapable of deducing regular conclusions from having been once deceived, and the last two not likely to come in your way a second time) is sufficiently compensated by the immediate benefit which you proposed by the falsehood.” What miserable paltering is this! If a lie is to be justified by mere expediency, or by any man’s judgment of expediency, how shall we know when we meet falsehood or when we meet truth? How can it be, that, under the universal, perpetual, and particular providence of God, who is infinitely true, a falsehood can ever issue except in disorder and mischief? Even if the immediate issue be slight or even apparently beneficial, is not the general importance of truth incomparably above such petty, doubtful considerations? Yet we cannot see, how, under such a system, any better reasoning could be pursued. There are cases, undoubtedly, in which we are not under obligation to speak at all, or even when silence is duty; but if we speak, and speak not truth, we serve the devil, who is the father of lies, and we shall, if we repent not in Christ, have our portion with him under the wrath of a just God, who has made truth a duty to himself, and a lie a sin against himself. The question cited is but one of innumerable that will arise under a system of ethics other than that which makes God the only object of duty.

For this reason we shall adopt, in all our subsequent study of the moral law, the division of duty into duties to God immediate and mediate,—those we should render to God directly, and those we should render to him through his creatures in serving them for his sake, according to his command.5

1 See Jer. Taylor; Duc. Dub. B. II. Ch. 2, Rule 6.

2 See Kenrick (Bishop), Theol. Mor. de Decalogue, c. iv.

3 Compare Gal. iii. 16, and Isaiah liii. 10, 11.

4 Calvin’s Cat. on the Fourth Commandment.

5 This is the division adopted and pursued by Ursinus. See his Commentary on the Catechism here.