Dissertation IV. On the Faith of the Existence of God
I. God is at once the principal and the ultimate object of faith; “Ye believe in God,”1 said our Lord to his disciples; and says the Apostle Peter,—“who by Him,” that is, Christ, “do believe in God.”2 Believers consider God as the self-existent, uncreated truth,3 on whom they may rely with the greatest safety; and as the supreme felicity, united to whom by faith, they may become inexpressibly happy. The Creed, accordingly, begins with these words, I believe in God.
II. Many have supposed that these three phrases, Credere Deum, to believe God, credere Deo, to believe God,4 and credere in Deum, to believe in God, ought to be thus distinguished; that the first means, to be persuaded of his existence;5 the second, to give credit to God when he testifies any thing; the third, to rely upon God with a saving confidence of soul.
III. But as this distinction has no foundation in the Scriptures, so it takes its rise from total ignorance of the Hebrew idiom. The expression Credere Deum, to believe God, no where occurs in holy writ. Paul says, “he that cometh unto God, must believe that he is:6 and in Deum credere, to believe in God, is a Hebraism, contrary to the ancient purity both of the Greek and the Latin tongue.—The Hebrews use indifferently, ל, or ב, in connexion with חאמין; as in the expression ויאמינו בדבריו “Then believed they his words,”7 and, לא האמינו לדברו “They believed not his word.”8 This Hebraism, in common with many others, was imitated by the Hellenists,9 and by the sacred writers of the New Testament. Let the following instance suffice. In John viii. 30. it is said, πολλοι ἐπιστευσαν εἰς αὐτον, “many believed on him;” and verse 31. the same persons are called πεπιστευκοτας αὐτω, “those who believed him.” Hence it appears that they are greatly mistaken, who assert that the expression to believe in one, signifies that devout affection of mind which is an homage due to God alone; for it is expressly said, ויאמינו ביהוה ובמשה עבדו, “and believed (in) the Lord, and (in) his servant Moses.”10 Those, also, are mistaken, who suppose that the phrase to believe in God or in Christ, is always descriptive of a living faith; since it is said of the Ninevites that they believed in God,11 and of the Jews, that they “believed in his,” to wit, Christ’s “name,” to whom “Jesus did not commit himself;”12—whilst, on the contrary, a different expression is made use of, to denote a living and saving faith, in John v. 24. πιστευων τω πεμψαντι με, “he that believeth him that sent me;” and in the account of the Jailor, πεπιστευκως τῳ θεῷ, “who believed God,”13 both phrases are used indiscriminately.14
IV. When we speak of God, we understand a Being who is infinitely perfect, since he is the Creator and Lord of all other beings. This is the idea common to all nations, which they express, each in their own language, whenever they make mention of God. Now, in order to a man’s believing in God, it is necessary, first of all, that he be firmly persuaded in his mind that such an infinitely perfect Being doth really exist. “For he that cometh unto God, must believe that he is.”15 But, since this persuasion lays a foundation for itself in Nature, upon which Grace rears the superstructure of Divine revelation, it will be proper to see, first, what nature can teach us on this topic, and then, what the Christian faith superadds to the persuasion derived from nature.
V. The existence of God is so necessary and so evident a truth, that to one rightly attending to the subject, scarcely any thing can appear more certain, more obvious, or more manifest. It is clear even from that notion of a Deity which is common to all nations. Whoever speaks of God, speaks of a Being infinitely perfect. Such a Being, however, cannot even be conceived of in thought, without including in our conception the necessity of his existence. For, since it is a greater perfection to exist than not to exist; to exist necessarily than to exist contingently and according to the pleasure of another; to exist from eternity and to eternity, than to exist at one time and not to exist at another time;—it follows that existence, even a necessary and eternal existence, is implied in the essence of a most perfect Being. It is as impossible to form an idea of a most perfect Being without necessary existence, as an idea of a mountain without a valley.
Besides, the man who denies that there is a God, denies, at the same time, that it is possible for an absolutely perfect and eternal Being to exist. For if he at any time begin to exist, he will not be eternal, and therefore not absolutely perfect, and consequently not God. But it is impossible that a being who neither is, nor can begin to be, can ever exist. According to this supposition, then, the impossibility of existence will be included in the conception of a Deity; which is no less contradictory, than if one should say, that the want of eminent perfection is necessarily included in the conception of that which is infinitely perfect.16
VI. The Creator has so deeply impressed the idea of his own existence on the human mind, that all may receive this knowledge from nature. “That which may be known of God is manifest in them; for God hath showed it unto them.”17 This is what is usually termed the innate knowledge of God. Eusebius speaks, not improperly, of the “notions which every one learns from himself, or rather from God.”18 It is not intended, that infants possess an actual knowledge of God even from the womb; which is equally contrary to universal experience, and to the word of God, which testifies that they “cannot discern between their right hand and their left.”19 Nor is the above expression to be so loosely understood, as if God merely endowed men with a capacity of knowing himself, provided the proofs of his existence be clearly proposed and set before them, or provided every one make a right use of his capacity in the investigation of those proofs;—as if the knowledge of God’s existence could not be attained without laborious exertion. But we intend, that God has so deeply impressed the traces of himself upon the innermost parts of the mind, that man, after having arrived at the use of reason, cannot but often think of a God, and it is only by doing violence to himself that he can expel such thoughts from his breast.
VII. Maximus Tyrius, the Platonic philosopher, has the following beautiful sentence in his first Dissertation.20 “But if, since the beginning of time, two or three men have existed, that have lived in an atheistical, degraded and senseless state, deceived by their own eyes and ears, maimed in their very soul,—a brutish and unprofitable kind of men, no less destitute of the distinguishing glory of their species, than a lion without courage, an ox without horns, or a bird without wings;—from even these men you will learn something concerning a Deity; for, in spite of themselves, they both know and express something on this subject.” Julian, too, ungodly as he was, expresses himself equally well, as follows: “All of us, previously to our receiving instruction, are persuaded that there is a Deity; and that to him we should look, to him we should hasten. Our minds are inclined towards him in the same manner, I think, as our eyes towards light.”
VIII. This argument is illustrated by the operations of Conscience, which, in a variety of ways, convinces men of the existence of God. 1st, As it is the deputy of God, and the depositary of his laws in the human breast, it inculcates, in the name of God, what ought to be done, and what ought to be avoided. So great, too, is the authority with which it speaks, that though the lords of the earth, and dreaded tyrants, should establish a thousand decrees in opposition to its dictates, it would, nevertheless, incessantly urge by its secret whispers, that obedience must be rendered to itself, and to God, in whose name it speaks, rather than to any mortal whatever. It says concisely, and with a dignity worthy of a Lawgiver, “Universal submission is due to me, and to God.”21 This is what David intends when he says, “My heart said unto thee,”22 that is, for thee, in thy behalf, in thy place.23 2dly, While it is acquainted with the most hidden secrets of men, and while neither the least imagination, nor the slightest motion of the mind, can be concealed from its view, it testifies, at the same time, that there is another besides itself, who is thoroughly acquainted with all our actions, words and thoughts. It is for this reason it is called Conscience,24 that is, a witness associated with another in perceiving the secrets of man; and who can that other be but God? On this account, also, it may be denominated “Conscience towards God.”25 3dly, When it judges the state and the actions of men, it performs this office under God, and with reference to God. Whilst it commends good works, even though performed in secret, and though disapproved by others, it gives us to know that the praise of the upright “is not of men, but of God.”26 When it rewards the good man with a most delightful tranquillity, and, in particular, when it causes his peace to abound in dying moments, it shows that God is the Rewarder of those who serve him.27 When it reproves, accuses, condemns, punishes, and scourges a man without mercy for his wicked deeds, although it is within the man, and indeed a part of him, it stands, however, on God’s side; nor doth it regard the degree of torment which the man may suffer from its testimony. Nay, though it be a thousand times enjoined to keep silence, though it be treated with violence, though it be almost stiffled, and seared as with a hot iron, yet it rises again, and sharply presses its testimony, in defiance of the struggles of the guilty. 4thly, Amidst all these operations, it summons man to the tribunal of God, and intimates that there all things are to be re-examined, and a more exact judgment to be passed on every action; and, according to the sentence which it has pronounced here, it causes him either to come into the presence of God with confidence, or to tremble at the thought of appearing before him. Such, also, is the energy which it displays, that it will not suffer itself to be hindered in these operations by any created power. “If our heart condemn us, God is greater than our heart, and knoweth all things. Beloved, if our heart condemn us not, then have we confidence towards God.”28 Paul gives us a concise summary of the greater part of these operations, when he says of the Gentiles, “These, having not the law, are a law unto themselves; which show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the mean while accusing or else excusing one another.”29 Nor are these the terrors of weak minds, which the stronger can easily elude. Conscience often restrains and overawes the boldest; and the most daring profligate, though he may assume the semblance of hope in his countenance, only conceals the pain which deeply pierces his heart. The laughter of such audacious transgressors is merely constrained, while they feel the smart of the sting within.
IX. This faculty of Conscience, because it so powerfully manifests God to man, doth all in his name, refers all to him, and, in short, acts the part of his vicegerent in the soul, was called God by the Heathen. Hence Menander says, “Our mind is God.”30 Euripides, in like manner, quoted by Gataker, says, “Our own mind is to each of us God.”31 By this, they intended nothing else, probably, than what that old writer expresses more clearly thus, “In all men, conscience stands in the place of God.”32 But the following passage of Epictetus is particularly worthy of notice: “Knowest thou not that thou nourishest a God? That thou givest exercise to a God? Dost thou not carry God about with thee, thou wretch, and art not aware of this? You imagine, perhaps, that I refer to something external, formed of gold or silver. Let me tell you that you carry him within your breast. - - - - But whilst God himself is present within, and sees and hears all things, art thou not ashamed, as if insensible to thine own nature, and hostile to God, to think and to do these things?”33 For the same reason, Plato says, “He mystically called those Atheists, who corrupt the God who dwelleth in them, that is, Reason.”34
X. The mind, also, which attends to itself, cannot be ignorant that as it was made by God, so it was made for God. Since it is clear and evident to the mind, that it did not consent of its own accord and by deliberate counsel to inhabit this body which it carries about; nor form the body for itself; nor subject it to its authority; nor even knows how the bodily members in subjection to it, are moved according to its will; nor existed any where else before it lodged in the body; nor became what it is by the contrivance or power of parents; nor is able to furnish itself with what it perceives to be necessary to its welfare; nor can find in itself the cause of its existence;—it is forced to acknowledge that it was created, and that, therefore, it is the property of him who created it. This can be no other than God; and, as it was made by him, it necessarily follows that it was also made for him. The eye is adapted for light, the ear for sounds, the tongue for speech, and speech for the interpretation of the mind. For what is the mind itself adapted? For an object, certainly, which can fill it—an object, the knowledge of which can make it wise, the love of which can make it holy, the enjoyment of which can make it happy. For an object, better than itself, nobler than all created things, and most amply sufficient to satisfy its boundless capacities. For an object, in short, which is nothing less than God. The human mind, provided it only give attention to the subject, must clearly perceive, that if no such object as this existed, it could never have itself existed, or if it had, must have existed in vain, and for no proper purpose. That man offers violence to his own mind, who does not say, “Where is God my Maker, that giveth songs in the night?”35
XI. But, besides that innate knowledge of God, of which man has the principles in his own mind, there is another argument arising from the consideration of the various other creatures around him. Since these are unable to secure the continuance of their own existence, it is manifest that they were not made by themselves: and if we trace them particularly, through the second causes of their being, as far backwards as our mind is able to conduct us, we must arrive, at length, at the First Cause, to whom those that are supposed to be the first of creatures owe the beginning of their existence, and in whose eternity, (as he exists necessarily, of himself, and without beginning,) all our thoughts are swallowed up, as in an immeasurable abyss. The sacred writings instruct us in numberless passages, that the existence of the Supreme Being may be inferred, by incontrovertible arguments, from the contemplation of the creatures.36
XII. A very emphatical passage to this effect occurs in Job xii. 7, 8, 9. “But ask now the beasts, and they shall teach thee; and the fowls of the air, and they shall tell thee; or speak to the earth, and it shall teach thee; and the fishes of the sea shall declare unto thee. Who knoweth not in all these, that the hand of the Lord hath wrought this?” Here we are directed to hold a conference with the creatures, that they may instruct us concerning the Creator. That conference can mean nothing but an attentive consideration of the creatures, in their origin, in their nature, in their capacities, in their operations, in their order and mutual subserviency to each other, in the law to which they are subject, and which is inviolably observed for the preservation of the whole. The response which they give, the doctrine which they unfold, is the demonstration of the Deity. They had no power to produce themselves, and even now they have no power to uphold themselves in being, far less to govern themselves with so much wisdom, that every one, in its own sphere, should both possess what is sufficient for the continuation of its own existence, and be adapted for assisting others and for serving the whole universe, as if most judiciously ranged in a family and state. Notwithstanding, therefore, the profound silence which they observe, they proclaim to every reflecting mind, that, as they were originally created, so they are still directed, by the hand of an infinitely wise, as well as infinitely powerful God. Let it be remarked, also, that this conclusion is not ascribed to any tradition received from the fathers, but to that very instruction which the creatures themselves afford, independently of all human tradition.
XIII. No less forcible is the testimony which we have, Psalm xix. 1, 2, 3, 4. which I shall explain by a short paraphrase. “The heavens declare the glory of God;” for they are his throne, which he has curiously fashioned, and which testify his power, majesty, and magnificence. “And the firmament showeth his handy-work;” proclaiming that it was adjusted by his word alone, that things below might be aptly and commodiously united with things above, and that things terrestrial might be maintained by the influence of things celestial, communicating itself through the medium of the firmament. “Day unto day uttereth speech, and night unto night teacheth knowledge.” The vicissitudes of light and darkness, succeeding one another in so exact and so uniform an order; and, (which is the cause of these appointed vicissitudes,) the revolution of the sun and the stars, neither moving more slowly than at the first, nor revolving with a more rapid motion, but still preserving the original measure of their course,—clearly manifest a Ruler of unbounded wisdom. Nor is there a single day, or single night, which doth not at once utter something for itself respecting God, and bear witness to another; as if it were the scholar of the preceding, and the teacher of the following. No word is uttered, no speeches are made, their voice “is not heard.” They do not teach by words; because, were this their manner of giving instruction, it would cease with the utterance of the words. They do not instruct by speeches, or discourses, which consist of a train of arguments artfully connected; for, in such discourses, some degree of obscurity could hardly be avoided. Nor do they utter an audible voice in our ears, the sound of which might dun us by its excessive noise. But the heavens instruct us, constantly, clearly, and pleasantly, whilst they exhibit the perfections of their Creator to view, as in a mirror. Some, however, choose to translate the words thus, (of which we do not disapprove:) “There is no speech, nor language, where their voice is not heard.” Though the nations differ from one another in their languages, and though the Greek may not be able to understand the Barbarian, yet the language of the heavens is common to all, and equally capable of imparting instruction to all. Nothing but listlessness hinders those, whose tongues and customs are the most opposite to each other, from receiving knowledge, so to speak, from the mouth of one and the same teacher. “Their line is gone out to all the earth.”37 The manner in which the heavens give instruction, bears a resemblance to the method of teachers, who instruct boys in the first principles of literature by means of figures which they draw for their use: For the luminaries of heaven, by the beams which they shed, form lines, and, as it were, first principles; which, being mutually combined, and variously connected, compose one entire book of wisdom. This idea is suggested by the word קו line; as in the expression קו לקו line upon line.38 It may be observed, also, that there is but little difference betwixt this Hebrew term, and the Greek φθογγος, made use of by the Apostle;39 for φθογγος signifies not only a sound, but likewise a letter; as in Plutarch on Fabius; of which Scapula has taken notice in his Lexicon. This line, then, has “gone out to all the earth, and their words to the end of the world.” All mankind, whether they inhabit cultivated regions, or the most desert and uncultivated parts of the earth, are instructed by this preceptor. There is no quarter of the world in which the figures of heaven, which are so many proofs of the divine perfections, are not beheld.
XIV. Though this exposition of the passage is at once simple, consonant to the words, and worthy of the divine perfections, Socinus most perversely contends, that it is here taken for granted, that it is not evident from the contemplation of the heavens, that they were created by God. He denies that they proclaim the glory of God to any but those who have been previously persuaded, by other means, of the existence of God, and of the creation of the world. What is said, too, about their line going out to all the earth, he restrains to Judea alone, adducing in confirmation of this sense, Psalm xlv. 16. cv. 7. ii. 8. This, however, is a daring perversion of the Scriptures; for, 1st, It is clear to any one who looks into the Psalm, that the Psalmist points out two ways of knowing God; the one by nature, which he describes from the beginning to the seventh verse; the other by revelation, which he then illustrates, and extols as far more perfect. Nor does he represent the latter as the foundation of the former, but the former as the foundation of the latter. 2dly, The words of the Psalm, cannot bear the interpretation which Socinus puts upon them, to wit, “The firmament showeth the nature and kind of the work, or celebrates the work:”40 But they must be interpreted thus, “The firmament showeth the work of his hands;” that is, proclaims itself to be the work of divine omnipotence. In this sense the heavens, the sun, the moon, and all the sparkling stars, are said to praise God; because, since they were all created at his command, they furnish men with the most abundant matter and ground for the celebration of his praise.41 3dly, Nor is this proclamation made to the Jews only: it is published in a language equally intelligible to Israelites, Greeks, and Barbarians; for he never left himself “without witness,” even to the Gentiles.42 4thly, It is published through the whole earth, even to the uttermost parts of the habitable globe; which are by no means comprehended within the narrow circuit of Judea: unless one chose also to confine within the limits of Judea, what the Apostle expresses in the same words,43 concerning that Gospel which is preached “to every creature.”44 5thly, Nor is the heretic able to point out any passage of Scripture, where these expressions, the whole earth, and the uttermost parts of the world, signify only the land of Judea; for the testimonies which he produces, are foreign to the purpose. Psalm xlv. 16. is a prophecy respecting the calling of the Gentiles; as appears from verse 17th. Psalm cv. 7, “His judgments are in all the earth,” is with no appearance of reason confined to Judea; since God executes judgments in the whole world, and those which he executed among his people, were published to the Gentiles. The heretic erroneously confounds the judgments of God’s works with the judgments of his law; which, under the old dispensation, were made known to the Israelites alone.45 Though we should grant that Judea is sometimes called the whole earth, yet the ends of the habitable world, are never limited to so inconsiderable a spot of earth. The words in Psalm ii. 8. refer not to the kingdom of David, but to the kingdom of Christ; to whom “all power is given in heaven and on earth;”46 and whose “dominion shall be from sea to sea, and from the river to the ends of the earth.”47 6thly, Though this were the meaning of the expression in some other passages, yet it cannot be so understood here; since the subject treated in this passage, is the whole of that earth, where the line of the sun is beheld,—where his glorious beams are seen, where his all-maturing heat is felt.
XV. We may add, that, in reality, had it not been long ago ascertained that these most audacious perverters of the Scriptures are lost to every emotion of shame, they must have been put out of countenance, on this occasion, by the more intelligent among the heathen; a great number of whom avow, that they were excited and compelled to acknowledge a Deity, purely by the consideration of the heavens, and the stars, and of the order which is observed in the universe. Plato’s expression is well known: “The heavens never cease to give instruction to mankind.”48 To the same effect are the following words of Lucilius in Cicero:49 “What can be so obvious, and so clear, when we have beheld the heavens and contemplated the celestial bodies, as that there is a Deity possessed of the most consummate wisdom, by whom they are governed?” And again, a little after; “If any one doubts of this, I know no reason why he may not also doubt of the existence of the Sun; for what can be more evident?” I shall quote another passage from Cicero. “Who is so stupid and infatuated,” says he, “as not to perceive, after having looked up to the heavens, that there are Gods; or to ascribe to the operation of chance, works which discover so great intelligence, that scarcely any one is able, by any art, to trace their order, and their revolutions.”50 But why do I insist on the convictions and declarations of individuals? Zaleucus, the lawgiver of the Locrians, by a law which he enacted, bound all his fellow-citizens to acknowledge a Divinity, from the contemplation of the heavens.51 According to the testimony of Diodorus Siculus, “Zaleucus, having been chosen by the people to frame laws, and attempting to confirm them by new sanctions, began by directing their attention to the celestial Gods. At the beginning of the preamble to the whole code he says; that the inhabitants of the city are required, first of all, to believe and to be firmly persuaded that there are Gods, and having attentively considered the heavens and their astonishing magnificence and order, to conclude that they are neither the production of chance, nor the workmanship of man.”52
XVI. Further, where can we find a more striking confirmation of the doctrine we are now illustrating, than the following remarkable expression of Paul? “For the invisible things of him, from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things which are made, even his eternal power and godhead.”53 Here notice, 1st, What respecting God the Apostle affirms to be known. 2dly, In what manner it is known. 3dly, From what time. 4thly, Whence this knowledge is derived.
XVII. 1st, What is it that is known respecting God? The Apostle, in the first place, shows, in general, that it is his “invisible things;” for it is one of the fundamental principles of religion, that God is a Spirit, quite distinct from the whole mass of matter, and invisible to every eye. He then takes particular notice of what is included in these “invisible things.” 1. His power; which, by his own simple fiat, with no assistance whatever, with no advantage arising from pre-existent matter—by his mere good pleasure—causes all things to exist, and to continue in existence so long as he pleases. 2. His eternity; which has neither beginning nor end of days, nor any thing corresponding to the succession of time. Unless God had existed from eternity, he could not have existed at all; for that which neither existed from eternity, nor is capable of being produced, has no existence; but that God is produced, is an idea utterly repugnant to every dictate of reason. A Being, too, who had no beginning, can have no end; for he possesses, in his own perfections, the cause of a necessary existence. Aristotle has, somewhere, finely said: “Necessary existence and eternity are inseparable from each other.”54 Unless God were eternal, besides, he could not be the lord of time, and the disposer of seasons. Synesius, accordingly, has the following elegant expression in his third Hymn, “Thou, who art the Eternal Mind, art the Root of the world.”55 3. His Godhead; which here means the perfections and excellencies of God; in particular, his self-sufficiency and absolute independence,56 and also the relation in which he stands to the creatures, as the Lord of all, and therefore entitled to the love and the service of all.
XVIII. 2dly, In what manner are these things known? They are “clearly seen by the mind.”57 1. Though not perceptible to the eye of the body, they are perceptible to the mind and soul: To the mind, however, that gives attention,58 and considers them; not to the mind that either resigns itself to stupidity and torpor, or that impiously excludes the light, and surrenders itself to a voluntary blindness. 2. By the attentive mind, they are “clearly seen:” For this knowledge, like the knowledge of those objects that are presented to the faithful eye, (as the sun, who enlightens the world, or the moon, or the stars,) is so prompt and easy, that men cannot reasonably demand a more ample or obvious demonstration.
XIX. 3dly, From what time are these things thus clearly seen? “From the creation of the world.”59 Some construe this clause in connexion with the words preceding, and give the sense thus, Those things which have been invisible ever since the creation of the world. But as the properties of the divine nature are necessarily and eternally invisible, it is better to refer the expression to what follows: They are clearly seen from the creation of the world. This, again, is susceptible of two senses. 1. It may denote the source of knowledge; as if the Apostle had said, “from the consideration of the creation of the world:” as in these words, “By their fruits ye shall know them.”60 2. It may respect the time; the Apostle may intimate, that those perfections of God have been displayed to mankind, as long as the world has existed, and been inhabited by the human race.
XX. 4thly, Whence, in fine, can men derive the knowledge of these perfections?—From “the things that are made.” The works of nature, which our eyes behold, testify concerning themselves, that they are “things made,”61 that is, that they have a Cause, a Maker, an Architect. Thus they lead us to the Maker of all, who, whilst he is entirely free from the imperfections of the creatures, possesses all their excellencies in a supereminent degree.
XXI. The way in which Socinus perverts the Apostle’s expressions in this passage, is truly surprising. By “the invisible things of God,” he understands the mysteries of the Gospel, which are said to “have been kept secret from the foundation of the world.”62 “His eternal godhead,” he affirms to be “that which God would constantly have us to do;” in which sense, he says, the term “godhead” is employed in Col. ii. 9. “His eternal power,” he would have to be, “the promises which shall never fail;” in which sense Paul had said, in a preceding verse of the chapter, that the Gospel is “the power of God.”63 Finally, he refers “the things that are made,” to the miracles performed by God, and Christ, and the Apostles.
XXII. On this strange exposition, we offer the following remarks. 1st, The heretic perverts the scope of the Apostle; which is to convince the Gentiles, who were destitute of the written word of God, of their having sinned and merited the curse; in the same manner as he convinces of their guilt and danger, the Jews who possessed the written word;64—that thus he may establish the conclusion, that both of them must be justified solely by the grace of God through faith in Christ.65 It is manifest, therefore, that the Apostle here considers the Gentiles, as in a state of nature, in the darkness of Paganism, not yet enlightened by the preaching of the Gospel.
XXIII. 2dly, He perverts, also, the words of the Apostle; for, 1. “The invisible things of God,” are quite distinct from the mysteries of the Gospel, which he does not even attempt to prove to be any where intended by that expression. The Apostle here opposes the eyes of the body to the eyes of the mind, and the things which he represents as invisible to the former, he asserts to be visible to the latter; as elsewhere he speaks of “the invisible God.”66 With regard to Matth. xiii. 35. we have there another expression, and an extremely different subject; and that saying of Christ, therefore, is improperly adduced to illustrate this passage of Paul. 2. “Eternal godhead,” and “that which God would constantly have us to do,” are totally different from each other. To endeavour to pass them for the same, is worthy of a man, who, “having his conscience seared as with a hot iron,” scruples not to confound things which are diametrically opposite to each other. By what authority, by what example, I say not from the sacred volume, but from any writer whatever, will he prove, that “godhead” is that which God would have us to do? That which he produces for this purpose from Col. ii. 9. discovers only the rage of a furious mind. The expression there, is not θειότης, but θεότης. Nor does the word in that passage, denote that which God wills to be done by us; for how doth this dwell in Christ, and dwell bodily in him? But it signifies the divine nature itself, which resides in Christ, not typically and symbolically, as in the temple of old, but truly and really. 3. The “eternal power” of God, nowhere denotes his promises. The Gospel is called “the power of God,” because it is an efficacious mean of salvation; the word “power” being taken in its native sense. The Apostle does not intend to intimate, that the Gospel is the promise of God; but that, in converting his elect by the preaching of the Gospel, accompanied with the energy of the Holy Spirit, God displays “the exceeding greatness of his power, according to the working of his mighty power.”67 4. Miracles are not usually called “things that are made,”68 but “mighty deeds, signs, wonders.”69 Ποίημα signifies a thing created by God, as in Ephes. ii. 10. “For we are his workmanship, created,” &c.70 Ποίημα and κτισμα are words of the same import; and, accordingly, the Arians of old, blasphemously styled Christ, Ποίημα καὶ κτισμα, a made being, and a creature.
XXIV. It is disgraceful for those who wish to be called Christians to wrest to another meaning, such clear and satisfactory testimonies of Scripture; since even heathens ascended from the consideration of the world to God its Creator. Aristotle, or whoever else is the Author of the Book concerning the world,71 says: “It is, therefore, an ancient doctrine, and a sentiment congenial to all mankind, that of God, and through God, all things were framed and established.” This doctrine, however, doth not rest upon ancient tradition alone; it is strongly inferred from the imperfection of all the creatures. Hence it is added by that Author, “For no creature, deprived of that support which He affords, is sufficient for its own subsistence.” This is fair reasoning. It is highly proper to rise from the imperfection and insufficiency of the creatures, to the absolutely perfect and all-sufficient Creator. Whatever is called imperfect, is accounted such, because it falls short of what is perfect. Take away that which is perfect, as Boethius reasons;72 and it becomes impossible even to conceive, whence that which is deemed imperfect, derived its existence. Cicero also says, “The beauty of the world, and the order of the heavenly bodies, oblige us to acknowledge the existence of some glorious and eternal Being, whom mankind are bound to admire and adore.”73
XXV. This truth is confirmed by the admirable predictions of astonishing events which were yet in the womb of futurity, by the fatal periods of monarchies, and by several other considerations of this sort. But as those arguments have been copiously illustrated by others, let it suffice that we have merely alluded to them here.74
XXVI. Since the doctrine of the existence of God is established by so many, and by so clear and incontrovertible evidences, it ought to receive the firm assent of every individual. Doubts of it should not be entertained, at any time, or upon any pretext;—not even for the purpose of attaining, in consequence of doubting, a more certain knowledge and a stronger faith. This truth is so manifest, that no man who seriously attends, can seriously doubt of it. Those who were anciently called Atheists, were at once very few, and generally men of a profligate character, whose interest it was that there should be no God. They were actuated, too, in their reasonings, rather by a love of contradiction, than by any sincere conviction of mind; like the man who contended that snow is black. Besides, as Vossius has shown,75 persons were sometimes stigmatized as Atheists, merely because they renounced the false gods of the Gentiles. Whatever be the purpose in view, to plunge into doubts of the existence of God, is always contrary to piety. It is never right to say, “Perhaps there is no God; perhaps, in all the thoughts which we have of a Deity, we are deceived by some malignant and powerful spirit.” This truth, however, must not be negligently passed over; nor are we rashly to presume that we already possess a competent knowledge of so noble a subject, lest, possibly, we may not duly love or adore a God whom we do not sufficiently know. To attend carefully and deliberately to this matter, is not to doubt of the existence of God, but to doubt concerning ourselves, whether we have discharged our duty in this respect with becoming diligence.
XXVII. Nature and Reason are able to teach man, though a sinner, all that we have hitherto said respecting the existence of God. Of all this, faith avails itself, as a groundwork; not overthrowing nature, but ascending by it, and above it. Tertullian, accordingly, well observes; “God has, in the first instance, appointed nature your teacher, intending to follow up her instructions with prophecy; that, having been the disciple of nature, you may the more readily give credit to prophecy.”76 Clement of Alexandria says, also, to the same effect: “The Greek philosophy, as it were, purifies and prepares the mind for the reception of faith; upon which, truth raises the superstructure of knowledge.”77 In this sense we may excuse his expression in another place, where he calls Natural Philosophy, “the groundwork of Christian Philosophy.”78 Let us now see what Christian Faith superadds to this natural persuasion concerning the existence of God.
XXVIII. 1st, It disposes one to observe with attention, those proofs of a Deity which every part of the creation affords. “By faith we understand,” observe, and consider.79 Many things “which may be known of God,” and which are placed in the clearest light, are neglected by the generality of men, their eyes being blinded. In this concern, the greater part of mankind are cold, languid, and torpid: and, hence, they either rest in a bare notion of the Divinity, or if they descend a little deeper into the contemplation of his character, are satisfied with meagre elements of truth, which they pollute by a large mixture of error; so that, while they seem to be wise, and give indulgence to their own reasonings, they are, in reality, fools. Those, in particular, who, instigated by the fury of a wicked mind, wish that there were no God, (of whose character, as the avenger of crimes, they cannot be ignorant,) exert themselves to suppress all thoughts of a Deity, which are never welcome to their hearts. Of such persons, the Apostle says, “they did not like to retain God in their knowledge:”80 that is, as Theophylact explains it, “they rejected the knowledge of God.” This, as Chrysostom observes, was, on their part, “not a sin of ignorance, but a wilful sin.” It was of the same nature with the sin of those who say to God, “Depart from us, for we desire not the knowledge of thy ways.”81 But Christian faith causes one to love the truth relating to God, and, consequently, to attend with care to the evidences by which the beloved truth is confirmed, and to take pleasure in the contemplation of them; singing to God, “My meditation of thee shall be sweet; I will be glad in the Lord.”82 It keeps at a distance, at the same time, all pretended wisdom and vain conceit of science, and determines a man to become an humble disciple of God, to hang upon his lips alone, and to desire instruction from him, in other matters relating to the Deity; saying, “Who teacheth like him?”83
XXIX. 2dly, It is not satisfied with knowing the Divinity by those evidences which nature supplies; but depends, also, on the testimony of God, who testifies concerning himself, as well externally by the word of divine revelation, as internally by the secret voice of the Spirit. He believes that God is, because he hears his word, and finds it so wise, so pure, so sweet, so efficacious, and so full of majesty, that it can be nothing else than the word of God. As one believes that his father is present, because he hears his well known voice, so faith believes that God is present in the world, because with her own ears she hears that divine voice, which, with incredible power and sweetness, penetrates to the inmost soul, and widely differs from all the illusions of deceiving spirits. As the spouse no sooner hears the familiar accents of her beloved Husband than straightway she cries out, “The voice of my Beloved! behold, he cometh;”84 so the believer, when he hears the voice of God in the world, knows and discerns it,85 and exclaims; “My Lord, and my God!”86
XXX. 3dly, Nature teaches merely, in an indistinct and general manner, that there is a God; but doth not expressly and particularly declare what he is. Maximus Tyrius, whom we formerly quoted, after having, in his first Dissertation, made some general remarks respecting the Deity, adds: “That distinguished Master of the Academy,” (he intends Plato,) “shows that such a Father and Author of the Universe exists: but he does not mention his name, for he did not know it.” Clement of Alexandria, not unjustly, represents the Gentiles as guilty of Atheism, and that twofold; first, “as they knew not him who is truly God;” and, secondly, as “they regarded those who are not, as though they were; and called those Gods, who, in reality, are not so.”87 Vossius, also, says with great elegance: “The same thing happened to them as to the blind man of whom we read in the Gospel of St John.88 When this man saw the Son of God, from whom he had received sight, he inquired, nevertheless, who was the Son of God: for he did not know that he whom he saw, was the person whom he saw; as if you should see the King, and not be aware that the man whom you see is the King. Almost all the Gentiles, in like manner, saw him who is invisible displaying himself in his works, and heard him declaring by expressive silence, that he is the Creator and Ruler of the universe, and that he demands and is entitled to our worship: But they shut their eyes against the sight, they stopped their ears against the voice; as if overpowered by a deep sleep, they imagined that he resembles those objects which daily presented themselves to their eyes; and, giving easy credit to their own dream, they adored the work instead of the Artificer, and rendered divine honours, not to God, but to that which is not God. This was, certainly, to change the truth into a lie.”89 The same writer expresses himself elsewhere in a manner equally excellent; and, although the passage is somewhat long, it illustrates the subject so well, that I shall not hesitate to quote it. It is as follows:90 “Though we know something of God by nature, yet we do not know the true God but by divine revelation. - - - Nor let it be objected, that it is wrong to affirm that the Gentiles knew not the true God, since the Apostle himself says of them that they knew God.91 For, as Oedipus, when, as the Poets tell us, he knew that he had a father, was yet ignorant that Laius was his father; so the Gentiles, whilst they were enabled by the light of nature to know that there is one God, and that he is the Fountain of all good, knew not, however, who is that God. Hence, as the Apostle testifies, it was necessary that this Unknown God should be declared unto them.92 The knowledge of God, then, is of two kinds; the one, simple, by which it is understood, in general, that there is a God, and that he is a wise, good, and powerful Being, the rewarder of righteousness, and the avenger of wickedness; the other, determinate, and applied to a certain object, namely, the God of Israel. The Gentiles, we admit, possessed the former, but they were destitute of the latter; for they imprisoned in falsehood and unrighteousness, those bright conceptions which they had of God, and ascribed them, not to the true, but to a false Deity. Hence, in many passages of Scripture, they are said not to have known God.”
XXXI. Christian faith, on the contrary, being instructed by the doctrine of Christ,93 is acquainted with the name of God; and makes mention of that name, saying, “Thou, whose name alone is Jehovah, art the Most High over all the earth.”94 Faith recognises Divinity in God himself, and doth not ascribe his prerogatives to one who is not God. It doth not say, “Jehovah hath not done all this;”95 which would be to alienate from God the glory of his godhead, and of his works. Faith knows distinctly, that he alone is God, who manifested himself to our first parents in paradise, and afterwards, “at sundry times and in divers manners,” to patriarchs and prophets; and at last condescended to make a visible appearance in the person of the Son, clothed with human flesh. As he proclaims himself in his word, saying, “I, even I, am Jehovah, and besides me there is no Saviour;”96 so faith assents to this declaration, and replies, “Thou, even thou, art Jehovah alone; thou hast made heaven, the heaven of heavens with all their host,” &c.97 It belongs to the sincere Christian to say in truth, what was vauntingly said by Tryphon in Lucian, or the author, whoever he be, of the Dialogue entitled Philopatris: “Having discovered the Unknown God of Athens, we will adore him, and, with hands stretched forth towards heaven, render thanks to his name.”
Notes
Note XXII. Page 70.
By the Hellenists we understand those Jews who spoke the Greek language, and made use of the Greek Translation of the Old Testament Scriptures, commonly called the Septuagint. The word ἑλληνισται occurs, indisputably, at least twice, in the New Testament, viz. Acts vi. 1, and ch. ix. 29, in both of which places it is rendered by our translators Grecians. There is, however, an obvious difference betwixt ἑλληνες, the word uniformly employed to signify Greeks or Grecians, and ἑλληνισται, Hellenists or Grecizers. The former denotes persons of Greek, or more largely of Gentile, extraction; the latter, those who wrote or spoke Greek. Beza, Wolfius, and some others, have contended that by the Hellenists is meant “such persons as had been converted from Heathenism to Judaism.” But this opinion is inconsistent with the Syriac Version, which renders the expression, “Jews that understood Greek;” and contrary to the testimony of Chrysostome, who affirms that it means “those that speak Greek,” in opposition to the βαθεις Ἑβραῖοι, the profound or deep Hebrews. See the Notes of Hammond and Doddridge on Acts vi. 1. The interpretation of Hellenists now given, is ably defended also by Jennings,98 and by Dr Campbell.99—Compare Note LXIV.
The Hellenists, while they spoke the Greek language, very naturally made use of the Hebrew idiom which prevails in the Septuagint. It were vain, too, to dissemble, that the inspired penmen of the New Testament itself very generally employ modes of expression borrowed from the Hebrew, and thus deviate from the classic purity of the Greek tongue. But what reasonable and impartial man could allow himself for a moment to entertain the idea, that this circumstance, which so well accords with the situation and acquirements of these “holy men of God,” serves, in any degree, to weaken the authority, impair the dignity, or detract from the value, of their inestimable writings?
Note XXIII. Page 72.
The first argument employed by our Author to prove the existence of the Deity, is that which is taken from the abstract idea, implanted in the mind, of an infinitely perfect Being. The honour of inventing this argument, which has been falsely ascribed to Des Cartes, seems to belong to Anselm, a native of Italy, and Archbishop of Canterbury in the twelfth century.100 The argument, it must be allowed, is abstruse, if not unsatisfactory; and it might have been omitted without impropriety. But from the subsequent reasonings of Witsius, it is evident he must not be considered as placing his chief dependance upon this proof of the grand article in question, or as subjecting himself to the rebuke administered to a certain class of writers by the celebrated Locke, in the following passage of his Essay on the Human Understanding.101
“How far,” says that profound writer, “the idea of a most perfect Being which a man may frame in his mind doth, or doth not prove the existence of a God, I will not here examine. For in the different make of men’s tempers and application of their thoughts, some arguments prevail more on one and some on another, for the confirmation of the same truth. But yet, I think, this I may say, that it is an ill way of establishing this truth and silencing Atheists, to lay the whole stress of so important a point as this upon that sole foundation, and take some men’s having that idea of God in their minds - - - as the only proof of a Deity; and out of an over-fondness for that darling invention, cashier, or at least endeavour to invalidate all other arguments, and forbid us to hearken to those proofs, as being weak or fallacious, which our own existence and the sensible parts of the universe offer so clearly and cogently to our thoughts, that I deem it impossible for a considering man to withstand them. For I judge it as certain and clear a truth as can any where be delivered, that the invisible things of God are clearly seen from the creation of the world, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and godhead.”
The argument for the existence of God taken from those numberless displays of his unbounded might, wisdom, and benignity, which the creation exhibits, is incomparably more clear and convincing than the argument a priori, even when stated in the most perspicuous and unexceptionable manner. Some authors, accordingly, who put a great value on the latter, are compelled to admit the superior utility, if not the superior weight, of the former. “Because we can have no true appropriate and distinguishing idea,” says Howe,102 “or conception of Deity, which doth not include a necessity of existence in it, we might have gone that shorter way immediately to have concluded the existence of God from his idea itself. And I see not but, treading those wary steps which the incomparable Dr Cudworth, in his ‘Intellectual System,’ has done, that argument admits, in spite of cavil, of being managed with demonstrative evidence. Yet since some most pertinaciously insist that it is at the bottom but a mere sophism; therefore, without detracting any thing from the force of it as it stands in that excellent work and the writings of some other noted authors, I have chosen to go this other way, as plainer and less liable to exception, though further about; and begun lower to evince, from the certain present existence of things not existing necessarily, or of themselves, their manifest dependance on what doth exist necessarily or of itself.”
“The argument a posteriori,” says even Dr Clarke,103 “is, indeed, by far the most generally useful argument, most easy to be understood, and in some degree suited to all capacities; and therefore it ought always to be insisted upon: But for as much as atheistical writers have sometimes opposed the being and attributes of God by such metaphysical reasonings as can no otherwise be obviated than by arguing a priori; therefore this manner of arguing also is useful and necessary in its proper place.” To this may be added the answer he returned to Mr Whiston on this subject, as narrated by the latter in his “Historical Memoirs.” “When Clarke brought me his book, I was in my garden against St Peter’s College in Cambridge, where I then lived. Now I perceived that in these Sermons he had dealt a great deal in abstract and metaphysical reasoning. I therefore asked him, how he ventured into such subtleties, which I never durst meddle with; and showing him a nettle, or some contemptible weed in my garden, I told him the weed contained better arguments for the being and attributes of God than all his metaphysics. Clarke confessed it to be so, but alleged for himself, that since such philosophers as Hobbes and Spinoza had made use of those kinds of subtleties against, he thought proper to show that the like way of reasoning might be made better use of; on the side of religion: which reason or excuse I allowed to be not inconsiderable.”104
Note XXIV. Page 74.
In quoting Psalm xxvii. 8, here and elsewhere,105 our Author, it is proper to observe, adopts a mode of rendering the verse, which is approved by respectable interpreters, and corresponds with the old English Version of the Psalms, where it is thus expressed; “Mine heart hath talked of thee, Seek ye my face: thy face, Lord, will I seek.” “The verse,” says the judicious Pool,106 “may be thus translated: ‘Concerning thee (as the particle Lamed is often used, or for or instead of thee, as it is unquestionably used Gen. xi. 3. Exod. xiii. 16. Prov. xxi. 18.) my heart said, Seek ye my face; thy face, Lord, will I seek.’”
Note XXV. Page 78.
The intelligent reader will not need to be reminded, that whilst he is referred to those admirable illustrations which the Sacred Volume supplies of that argument for the existence of God which arises from the works of his hand, our Author is decidedly of opinion, that this argument, even independently of Scripture, is calculated to convince and satisfy every upright and candid mind. On this subject much has been excellently written. Dr Clarke107 recommends the following books on “the wisdom of God in the final causes of things,” viz. Galen De usu partium, Cicero De Natura Deorum, Mr Boyle on Final Causes, and Mr Ray on the Wisdom of God in the Creation. Amongst the later publications on this topic, Dr Derham’s “Physico-Theology,” and his “Astro-Theology,” Sturm’s “Reflexions on the Works of God,” and Archdeacon Paley’s “Natural Theology,” have been particularly honoured with the stamp of public approbation. It may be added, that there is an able and popular discussion of the argument in question, in President Dickinson’s Sermon on Rom. i. 20, and that it is concisely but clearly and forcibly stated by Archbishop Secker in his sixth Lecture on the Creed.108
Note XXVI. Page 85.
Dr Clarke’s “Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God,”109 contains a passage on the evidences of the Divine wisdom afforded by the phenomena of the heavenly bodies, particularly worthy of attention. He begins with remarking, that “the older the world grows, and the deeper men inquire into things, and the more accurate the observations they make, and the more and greater the discoveries they find out, the stronger this argument continually grows.” Having made this general and important remark, he proceeds, in a great variety of instances, to contrast the stupendous discoveries of modern times with the ancient state of astronomical science, and to show what a vast accession of weight and evidence this argument has received since the days of Cicero. The passage is too long to be quoted here; but without question, it is by far the most striking and entertaining in that work.
Whilst the instructive and beautiful sayings of ancient philosophers are presented to view, their lamentable errors and defects ought not to pass unnoticed. It seems proper here to call the attention of the reader to that ignorance or indifference with regard to the unity of God, which Cicero and Zaleucus discover in the same sentences, in which they most seriously and decidedly disclaim the principles of atheism. The former says, “Who is so stupid and infatuated as not to perceive, after having looked up to the heavens, that there are Gods?” The latter, in like manner, required the Locrians, first of all, to believe that there are Gods. This is but a slight specimen of the language in general use among the wisest of the heathen. Many other examples are produced by the learned Dr Leland, who treats the subject at great length, and adduces it as one evidence of the insufficiency of the light of nature with respect to the knowledge and worship of the one true God, that “the greatest and best of the ancient pagan philosophers generally express themselves in the polytheistic strain, and instead of leading the people to the one true God, they speak of a plurality of Gods, even in their most serious discourses.”110
1 John xiv. 1.
2 1 Pet. i. 21.
3 Ἀυτο αληθεια.
4 The reader will observe that Deum is the accusative, or objective, and Deo the dative case, of the Latin word Deus, God: but if credere is rendered to believe, the English idiom requires us to translate credere Deo, as well as credere Deum, to believe God. We may say, to give credit to God; but we cannot say, to believe to him. T.
5 Existentia, or, as Macrobius expresses it, extantia.
6 Heb. xi. 6.
7 Ps. cvi. 12.
8 Ver. 24.
9 See Note XXII.
10 Exod. xiv. 31. See also 2 Chron. xx. 20.
11 זיאמיבז באלחים Jon. iii. 5.
12 John ii. 23, 24.
13 Acts xvi. 31, 34.
14 See the learned observations of Gomar on John ii. 23. xiii. 42.
15 Heb. xi. 6.
16 See Note XXIII.
17 Το γνωστον τοῦ Θεοῦ. Rom. i. 19.
18 Ἀυτοδιδακτοῦς ἔννοιας, μαλλον δε Θεοδιδακτους. Præparat. Evang. lib. ii. c. 5.
19 Jonah iv. 11.
20 Dissert. i. cujus inscriptio est, Quid sit Deus secundum Platonem?
21 Παντα ἐμοι καὶ τῷ Θιῷ. Arri. Epictet. lib. iv. cap. 8.
22 Psalm xxvii. 8.
23 See Note XXIV.
24 Συνειδησις, conscientia.
25 Συνειδησις Θεοῦ. 1 Pet. ii. 19.
26 Rom. ii. 29.
27 Heb. xi. 6.
28 1 John iii. 20, 21.
29 Rom. ii. 14, 15.
30 Ὁ νοῦς γαρ ἡμων ὁ θεος. Apud Plutarch in Platon. Quæst. i.
31 Gat. in notis ad Marc. Anton. p. 432.
32 Βροτοῖς ἁπασιν ἡ συνειδησις θεος.
33 Epict. apud Arrianum, lib. ii. cap. 8.
34 In Philebo.
35 Job xxxv. 10.
36 See Note XXV.
37 בכל הארץ יצא קום
38 Is. xxviii. 13.
39 Rom. x. 18.
40 Firmamentum indicat quale sit opus, seu celebrat opus.
41 Ps. cxlviii. 1, 3, 5.
42 Acts xiv. 17.
43 Rom. x. 18.
44 Mark xvi. 15.
45 Ps. cxlvii. 20.
46 Matth. xxviii. 18.
47 Ps. lxxii. 8.
48 Ὀυρανος οῦδεποτε παυεται διδασκων ἀνθρωπους.
49 De Natura Deorum, lib. ii.
50 Orat. de Haruspic. Respo.
51 See Note XXVI.
52 Diod. Sic. lib. xii.
53 Rom. i. 20.
54 Το ἐξ ἀναγκης, καὶ ἀει ἅμα.
55 Προοῦσιε νοῦ, Κοσμοῦ ῥιζα.
56 Acts xvii. 25.
57 Νοοῦμενα καθορᾶται.
58 Νοοῦντι.
59 Απο κτίσεως κοσμοῦ.
60 Ἀπὸ τῶν καρπῶν αὐτῶν. Mat. vii. 16.
61 Ποιήματα.
62 Matth. xiii. 35.
63 Verse 16.
64 Ch. ii. 17.
65 Chap. iii. 9, 23, 24.
66 1 Tim. i. 17.
67 Ephes. i. 19.
68 Ποιήματα.
69 Δυνάμεις, σημεῖα, τερατα.
70 Ἀυτοῦ γαρ ἐσμεν ποίημα, κτισθέντες.
71 Liber de Mundo, cap. xi.
72 Lib. iii. Prosa. 10.
73 De Divinatione, lib. ii.
74 See Dan. iii. 26, &c. iv. 34. vi. 27.
75 De Idololatria, lib. i. cap. 1.
76 De Resur. Carnis.
77 Strom. lib. vii. p. 710. edit. Parisiensis, anno 1641.
78 Ὑποβαθραν της κατα Χριστον φιλοσοφιας. Lib. vi. p. 648.
79 Πιστει νοοῦμεν. Heb. xi. 3.
80 Οὐκ ἐδοκιμασαν τον Θεὸν ἔχειν ἐν ἐπιγνωσει. Rom. i. 28.
81 Job. xxi. 14.
82 Psalm civ. 34.
83 Job xxxvi. 22.
84 Song ii. 8.
85 John x. 4.
86 John xx. 28.
87 Admonitio ad Gentes, pag. 14.
88 Ch. ix.
89 De Idololatria, lib. i. cap. 4.
90 Hist. Pel. lib. iii. part iii. thes. 6.
91 Rom. i. 21.
92 Acts xvii. 23.
93 John xvii. 6.
94 Ps. lxxxiii. 18.
95 Deut. xxxii. 27.
96 Isaiah xliii. 11.
97 Nehem. ix. 6.
98 Jewish Antiquities, Book i. chap. 3. pp. 59–61. Edinburgh edit. 1808.
99 Preliminary Dissertations, pp. 5–10. 1st edit.
100 See Aikin’s General Biography, Art. Anselm.
101 Book iv. chap. 10. § 7.
102 Living Temple, Part i. chap. 2. Vol. i. p. 38.
103 See Encyc. Britan. Art. Clarke (Dr Samuel.)
104 See Encyc. Britan. Art. Clarke (Dr Samuel.)
105 See Dissert. v. Sect. 6.
106 Annotations, in loco.
107 Discourse concerning the Being and Attributes of God, p. 112.
108 Works, &c. Vol. iv. pp. 266–272.
109 Prop. xi. p. 177. et seq.
110 The Advantage and Necessity of the Christian Revelation, &c. Part i. ch. 14.